The Common Sense Foundation

Common Sense Says - template

WHO LOBBIES?

Recent surveys have found that 55% of Americans believe that elected officials are untrustworthy,¹ and of those people who do not trust government, 65% say their lack of trust is due to special interests having too much influence over the political process.² These special interests (called “principals”) make campaign contributions to candidates and also employ lobbyists to wine and dine legislators while promoting their principals’ policy goals.

Due to their ability to be at the General Assembly on a regular basis, lobbyists are likely to develop a rapport with legislators, and this relationship allows lobbyists to have greater access to members than their own constituents. Lobbyists who develop strong relationships with elected officials have more influence and therefore are more effective at advancing their principal’s interests.

One factor that helps determine a lobbyist’s effectiveness is how much money his or her principal has to spend. Large corporations often have the funds to hire a multitude of lobbyists to build relationships with many different legislators in order to increase their influence in the General Assembly. Smaller organizations, usually advocates for such causes as the environment or human rights, often only have the money to hire a single lobbyist who cannot possibly build the same number of relationships with legislators. This disparity creates an uneven playing field where big businesses have more influence over legislators and the legislative process than do smaller organizations.

A lobbyist could also have an increased advantage if he or she is a former legislator. These individuals are extremely effective in influencing current legislators because they already have relationships with many of them. Since legislators are usually re-elected, the former legislator’s relationships, and therefore influence, can last through many terms. Furthermore, businesses recognize the power of former legislators and hire them in order to broaden their already large influence in the General Assembly.

These two factors, a principal’s wealth and a lobbyist’s status as a former legislator, each give a lobbyist a greater amount of influence over the legislative process than lobbyists have who do not possess either of these characteristics. Lobbyists who advocate for the general public usually do not have either the money or the power to compete with ex-legislators who lobby for deep-pocketed corporate interests.

Not surprisingly, due to their past relationship with current members, some of the most effective lobbyists are former legislators. Eight out of the twenty-five current registered lobbyists who were former legislators are ranked in the top fifty most influential lobbyists, and there are three former legislators who rank in the top five lobbyists.³ This practice of legislators becoming lobbyists after they end their public service is called the “revolving door.” In North Carolina, unlike many Southern states, there is no “cooling-off period” between the end of a member’s stint in the General Assembly and the date on which he or she can register to become a lobbyist.

This lack of a “cooling-off period” (usually a year or two in other states) potentially allows for egregious abuses of the system. For example, a principal could approach a legislator about a policy issue, the legislator could work to pass it, and then the legislator could resign and work as a lobbyist for that principal. The North Carolina Secretary of State’s Advisory Council on Legislative Lobbying Policy and Regulation recommended that “given the potential for conflicts of interest and a concern for the appearance of impropriety in trading on positions of public trust and power,” a legislator should be prohibited from both becoming a lobbyist during the same legislative session and from lobbying on an issue on which the legislator had significant involvement in the past session.⁴

Some current lobbyists have recently benefited from North Carolina’s lax lobbying laws. The information below does not represent an accusation of illegal or unethical conduct; however, it does show how some legislators have used the perfectly legal revolving door to their advantage.

Connie Wilson served as a Republican state House member for almost six terms and then resigned in 2004 (three months before her term ended) to start her own lobbying business. While in the legislature, Wilson was a prime mover on a bill that pushed back the start date of schools in order to benefit the tourism industry. This bill was backed by the Travel Industry Association of North Carolina, the very same organization that now employs Wilson as a lobbyist.

Andy Dedmon served as the Democratic Whip in the N.C. House and on the insurance committee before losing his seat in 2002 and then becoming a registered lobbyist for Blue Cross Blue Shield in 2003. Furthermore, Dedmon received $6,500 in campaign contributions from Blue Cross Blue Shield in 2002, which was, except for the $8,000 that Marc Basnight received, more money than any other legislator received that year.⁵

Asheville Democrat Steve Metcalf is a former state senator who resigned from his third term and became a lobbyist for several business interests. However, while he was in office, Metcalf admitted approaching Progress Energy lobbyist Gene Upchurch about a possible job after Metcalf left office. Progress Energy reportedly told Metcalf that it was inappropriate to discuss job opportunities while he was still a state senator.⁶

Metcalf also admitted talking to Michell Hicks, the chief of the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians, about possible employment after Metcalf’s departure from the Senate. Furthermore, while serving as chairman of the Senate Education Committee, Metcalf was employed as the director of local government relations at Western Carolina University. He resigned when critics claimed that he faced a conflict of interest.⁷

These examples show that the revolving door presents real problems due to at least the appearance of a conflict of interest, as well as the conferring of unfair advantages to lobbyists who have just left public office.

There are 910 principals registered with the N.C. Secretary of State for the 2005-06 legislative session. Some principals have as many as nine lobbyists working for them, while many lobbyists will work for multiple principals (as many as fifteen).

Nearly 75% of the principals registered with the Secretary of State are business or medical interests. The bulk of the remainder are counties and municipalities, schools, and professional and social-service organizations.

Of the 910 principals registered to lobby, only 32 (or 3.5%) are advocates for working people (who represent more than 90% of the population).

By Common Sense interns Courtney Enlow and Elena Everett

____________________________________________

^{1 “How Americans View Government: Deconstructing Distrust.” Pew
Research Center for the People & the Press, March 1998.
2 “Americans Distrust Government, but Want It to Do More.”
NPR/Keiser/Harvard Kennedy School Poll. National Public Radio, 1999.}

³“Rankings of the Most Influential Lobbyists in the 2003 General Assembly.” North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research. September 2004.

⁴“The Secretary of State’s Advisory Council on Legislative Lobbying and Regulation: Final Report.” May 2004.

^{5“Federal PAC Report of Contributions to NC Political Committees.” Blue
Cross Blue Shield Political Action Committee. 14 October 2002.}

⁶Gardner, Amy. “Lobbying plans raise eyebrows.” News and Observer. 6 December 2003.

⁷Ibid.